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INTEREST OF AMICI
Amici are law professors who teach and write
in the field of federal jurisdiction.1 William Araiza is
Vice Dean and Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law
School. Howard M. Wasserman is Professor of Law at
Florida International University College of Law.
Lawrence Sager holds the Alice Jane Drysdale
Sheffield Regents Chair at the University of Texas
School of Law. Stephen I. Vladeck is Professor of Law
at American University’s Washington College of
Law. Ernest A. Young is the Alston & Bird Professor
at Duke Law School.
For decades, this Court’s decision in United
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872), has
stood as a central affirmation of judicial
independence; its precise holding, however, has been
the focus of considerable speculation and
disagreement.
Amici
believe
that,
while
disagreement persists among scholars about the
scope and theoretical underpinnings of Klein, there is
also widespread agreement about certain core
principles. This brief attempts to articulate those
principles and bring them to bear on the present
case.

This brief has been filed with the written consent of the
parties, which filed blanket consents with the Clerk of Court.
Pursuant to Rule 37.6, counsel for amici affirms that no counsel
for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, nor did any
person or entity, other than amici or their counsel, make a
monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this
brief.
1

1

STATEMENT
The statute at issue in this case embodies an
appealing policy choice. Respondents here represent
victims of state-sponsored terrorism who have
obtained default judgments against the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Under existing rules of law, Iran
possesses no assets within the United States that
Respondents may reach to satisfy those judgments.
Nonetheless, Respondents brought suit in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, attempting to reach almost $2 billion in
assets held, through a series of intermediaries, by
Petitioner, the National Bank of Iran. Respondents’
prospects in that suit were bleak until Congress
intervened through a special provision of the Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-158, § 502, 126 Stat. 1214,
1258, codified at 22 U.S.C. § 8772, that required the
district court to permit Respondents to reach the
assets in question.
Amici have little sympathy for the plight in
which Petitioner finds itself, and we readily agree
with Congress that Respondents’ claims cry out for
compensation. But by telling a federal court how to
decide a single case, and explicitly specifying that its
directive would have no effect on any other parties,
assets, or controversies no matter how similarly
situated, Congress offended two bedrock principles of
judicial independence. First, as this Court held in
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872),
Congress may not direct the resolution of a pending
case in an Article III court without amending the
underlying law. And second, even when Congress
does enact new law, it must act generally and not
with respect to a single case. When Congress
2

disregards these principles, as it did in the wake of
the Civil War, it will often have an appealing case on
policy grounds and the parties on the receiving end
will often be unattractive. But the core notion of
constitutionalism is that we insist on observing
constitutional limitations even when the equities of
the particular case push most strongly in the other
direction.
Like other separation of powers problems,
threats to judicial independence often come before
this Court “clad, so to speak, in sheep’s clothing.”
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). Congress may limit federal
jurisdiction in certain cases, assign a limited class of
claims to non-judicial actors, or play with standards
of review. But here, Congress has taken a single case
and told the courts how to decide it—a core violation
of our most fundamental commitment to judicial
independence and integrity. As Justice Scalia has
said in another context, “this wolf comes as a wolf.”
Id.
ARGUMENT
Section 8772 violates two closely related
principles vital to the separation of powers. First,
Congress may not direct the result in a pending case
without amending the underlying law. And second,
even if it does amend the underlying law, Congress
may not do so in a way that applies only to a single
case. Whatever else the separation of powers may
require when Congress acts in a way that impacts
pending litigation, judicial independence surely
demands this much. And it is difficult to imagine a
statute that would violate these principles more
blatantly than the one at issue in this case.
3

I.

Section 8772 violates the principle that
Congress may not direct the result in a
pending case without amending the
underlying law.

This Court’s decision in United States v. Klein,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871), has long been one of
the most mysterious and fascinating cases in the
Federal Courts canon. Scholars have offered a wide
range of diverse and often conflicting interpretations
of its meaning. But there has generally been a core of
widespread agreement that, whatever else Klein’s
language and holding may entail, it stands at a
minimum for the proposition that Congress may not
direct the result in a pending case without amending
the underlying law.2 This principle is generally taken
to be quite narrow, given that Congress may amend
the law in ways that foreseeably affect pending
litigation. But the general idea that Congress may
not tell a court how to apply the existing law—much
less instruct a court to disregard that law—is
foundational to judicial independence and the rule of
law. And this case plainly violates it.

See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, Why Klein (Still) Matters:
Congressional Deception and the War on Terrorism, 5 J. Nat’l
Sec. L. & Pol’y 251, 252–53 (2011); Howard W. Wasserman, The
Irrepressible Myth of Klein, 79 U. Cin. L. Rev. 53, 69-70 (2011);
Evan H. Caminker, Schiavo and Klein, 22 Const. Comment.
529, 533 (2005); William D. Araiza, The Trouble with
Robertson: Equal Protection, the Separation of Powers, and the
Line
Between
Statutory
Amendment
and
Statutory
Interpretation, 48 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1055, 1079, 1088 (1999);
Martin
H.
Redish,
Federal
Judicial
Independence:
Constitutional and Political Perspectives, 46 Mercer L. Rev. 697,
718-21 (1995).
2
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A.

United States v. Klein is best
understood to forbid Congress from
directing the result in a pending
case
without
amending
the
underlying law.

During the Civil War, Congress enacted the
Abandoned Property Collection Act, ch. 120, 12 Stat.
820 (1863), which provided an opportunity for
persons whose property was seized in the rebellious
states to obtain the proceeds from sale of that
property if they could prove that they had not “given
any aid and comfort” to the rebellion. Shortly
thereafter, President Abraham Lincoln issued a
presidential proclamation offering a full pardon—
including restoration of rights in seized property—to
persons who had been engaged in the rebellion if
they took a new loyalty oath. Some years later, in
United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531
(1870), this Court held that a person taking such an
oath and receiving a pardon would be deemed legally
loyal, and therefore entitled to restoration of
property under the Abandoned and Captured
Property Act. The Reconstruction Congress,
generally skeptical toward President Andrew
Johnson’s conciliatory policy toward the conquered
South, responded by enacting a statute barring the
use of a pardon to prove loyalty, taking a pardon to
be conclusive proof that the claimant had been
disloyal in fact, and requiring the federal courts to
dismiss claims predicated on a pardon for want of
jurisdiction.3
See generally Wasserman, supra note 2, at 59-63; Amanda L.
Tyler, The Story of Klein: The Scope of Congress’s Authority to
Shape the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, in Federal Courts
Stories 106 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2009).
3
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This Court struck down that statute in Klein.
The Court held that Congress’s action was not a
valid “exercise of the acknowledged power of
Congress to make exceptions and prescribe
regulations to the appellate power” of the Supreme
Court. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146. Even though
Congress may have broad power to restrict federal
judicial jurisdiction,4 Chief Justice Chase wrote that
Congress may not “prescribe rules of decision to the
Judicial Department . . . in cases pending before it.”
Id. Under the statute, “the court is forbidden to give
the effect to evidence which, in its own judgment,
such evidence should have, and is directed to give it
an effect precisely opposite.” Id. at 147. By so
requiring, “Congress has inadvertently passed the
limit which separates the legislative from the judicial
power.” Id. Finally, the Court also suggested that by
impairing the effect of a presidential pardon, the law
“infring[ed] the constitutional power of the
Executive.” Id.5

The Court had decided Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
506 (1869), only two years previously.
4

Id. It may be tempting to read Klein simply as a case about
the pardon power, holding that that Congress may not impair
the full effect of a presidential pardon any more than it may
restrict the President’s other exclusive powers. See, e.g.,
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015) (holding that
Congress may not impair the President’s exclusive power to
recognize foreign nations). But Chief Justice Chase plainly
raised the pardon issue in the alternative: Having found that
the statute “passed the limit which separates the legislative
from the judicial power,” he observed that “[t]he rule prescribed
is also liable to just exception as impairing the effect of a
pardon.” Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147; see also Caminker,
supra note 2, at 533 (observing that “the structure and
language of the Court’s opinion make clear that the two
5

6

Klein’s language about “prescrib[ing] rules of
decision” must be read, however, in conjunction with
numerous decisions holding that Congress may
amend the law governing pending litigation, and that
courts must ordinarily give such amendments
retroactive effect if Congress so intends.6 Klein itself
recognized as much by distinguishing Pennsylvania
v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
421 (1855). In May of 1852, the Court had held that
the Wheeling Bridge was an impediment to
navigation and ordered it removed. In August of the
same year, however, Congress passed an act
declaring that the bridge (as well as another bridge
in Ohio) was a lawful structure and designating both
as federal post roads. In the wake of this new
statute, the Court acknowledged that its prior decree
could no longer be executed, and it rejected any
argument that the new law interfered with the
judicial power. See id. at 431–32, 435–36.7 The Klein

separation of powers principles discussed in Klein operate in
the disjunctive”).
See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 273
(1994); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,
212 (1995) (“When a new law makes clear that it is retroactive,
an appellate court must apply that law in reviewing judgments
still on appeal that were rendered before the law was enacted,
and must alter the outcome accordingly.”).
6

As Petitioners rightly note, see Petitioner’s Brief at 36–37, the
Wheeling Bridge Court also emphasized that Congress’s statute
altered only the Court’s prospective decree directing removal of
the bridge. The Court suggested that the case would have come
out differently had there been a claim for damages, Wheeling
Bridge, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 431, and in fact the Court did
enforce the portion of its initial decree requiring the defendants
to pay costs, id. at 436. But we think the critical aspect of
Wheeling Bridge was that Congress had permanently, and for
7

7

Court found this decision perfectly consistent with its
own holding. “No arbitrary rule of decision was
prescribed in that case,” Chief Justice Chase wrote,
“but the court was left to apply its ordinary rules to
the new circumstances created by the act.” Klein, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146–47. In Klein itself, by contrast,
“no new circumstances have been created by
legislation.” Id. at 147.
This Court’s most recent interpretation of
Klein shows the narrowness of Klein’s core principle,
when read in conjunction with Congress’s
acknowledged power to change the underlying law.
In Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503 U.S.
429 (1992), the Court considered the validity of the
Northwest Timber Compromise, a federal statute
modifying timber harvesting restrictions in forests
home to the endangered spotted owl. The statute was
enacted in response to ongoing litigation challenging
whether the Bureau of Land Management had
adequately considered the impact of permitted
logging on the owl. As part of a compromise
restricting logging in some areas and permitting it in
others, § 318 of the statute designated particular
portions of federal land, including that concerned in
the ongoing litigation, as open to timber sales, and it
mandated that management of the land pursuant to
the law’s new provisions would be “adequate
consideration for the purpose of meeting the
statutory requirements that are the basis for” the
ongoing litigation, which it referred to by name and
docket number. See id. at 433–34.

all legal purposes, altered the underlying legal status of the
bridge.

8

The Ninth Circuit held that § 318 violated
Klein because it directed the resolution of a pending
case without amending the underlying law, but this
Court reversed. Assuming that the court of appeals’
reading of Klein had been correct, the Court
nonetheless found that the statute “compelled
changes in law, not findings or results under old
law.” Robertson, 503 U.S. at 438. That conclusion, on
Robertson’s facts, seems perfectly in line with Klein’s
distinction of the Wheeling Bridge case: Congress’s
intervention exempted the specific provisions of the
timber compromise from the general requirement
that agencies consider environmental impacts; after
all, Congress itself had considered those impacts in
formulating the compromise. And although the
compromise had the effect of eliminating the legal
basis for the plaintiffs’ suit, the statute changed the
law governing not just that suit but any other
challenge to the timber sales affected by the
compromise. Hence, “[t]o the extent that [the statute]
affected the adjudication of the [pending] cases, it did
so by effectively modifying the provisions at issue in
those cases.” Id. at 440.
Although Robertson maintained Klein’s central
distinction between directing law application and
amending the underlying law, it illustrates that
Congress may still achieve quite specific results
when doing the latter, and those results may
profoundly affect pending litigation. Critically,
Robertson concerned the management of federal
land, an exercise not of Congress’s general Article I
legislative powers but rather its Article IV power “to
dispose of . . . property belonging to the United
States.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3. Decisions about the
disposition of federal assets and resources are
9

necessarily more targeted than general legislation,
and it may be that Congress should be held to a
stricter standard when it exercises its general
legislative powers.8 But in any event, Congress’s
observance of the distinction between directing
application and amending law maintains important
separation of powers values.
B.

Precluding Congress from directing
results without changing the law
serves important separation of
powers values.

This Court’s decision in Robertson did not
expressly adopt the view that Klein’s prohibition
turns on the difference between directing the
outcome of a case and amending the underlying law;
it assumed that the court of appeals had been correct
in so reading Klein but found that the rule had not
been violated. See Robertson, 503 U.S. at 441. But
there is broad agreement among Federal Courts
scholars that Klein must mean at least this much.9
Whatever else, if anything, Klein may mean, its
prohibition on directing results without amending
the law serves critical values of judicial
independence and integrity.
Robertson also involved the exercise of delegated authority by
a federal agency. In this context, it made sense for Congress to
substitute its own deliberation on the environmental impact of
logging, represented by the compromise legislation, for the
statutory requirements that the agency consider those impact
that formed the basis of the plaintiffs’ suit. Congress was not
substituting its judgment for the courts’, but rather for the
agency’s judgment within the framework of a statutory solution
to a political controversy over the agency’s actions. That, of
course, is not this case.
8

9

See sources cited in note 2, supra.

10

At least two sets of separation of powers
values are salient in this context. The first concerns
the protection of litigants from an adjudication
process dominated by majoritarian politics. When
Congress amends the underlying law, it necessarily
deals with the subject of legislation in a more general
way than when it simply directs the outcome of a
pending case. Congress may be able to foresee the
impact of the law on the present litigation, but it
must also contemplate that, having been amended
generally, the law may govern other unforeseen cases
in the future. Even in Robertson, the specific mention
of the pending cases in the statute was merely
illustrative; the act’s provisions nonetheless
governed any other litigation that might arise
concerning the affected timber sales.
The Founders were concerned that the early
state legislatures had too often taken judicial
matters into their own hands.10 James Madison thus
had this abuse, among others, in mind when he
wrote that “[t]he accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”11 Our
Constitution requires the concurrence of multiple
institutional actors before individuals may be

See Federalist No. 48, at 310-12 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987)
(1788) (James Madison); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,
Inc. 514 U.S. 211, 221-22 (1995) (collecting sources); INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 960-62 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring in
the judgment) (same).
10

Federalist No. 47, at 303 (Isaac Kramnick, ed., 1987) (1788)
(James Madison).
11

11

deprived of liberty or property.12 This forces
legislators, to at least some extent, to enact laws
behind a veil of ignorance, knowing that those laws
may well be applied to their own constituents or
supporters.13 And it assures individuals that when
the law is actually applied to them, it will be in a
judicial forum with all the procedural protections
that such a forum affords.14
The second set of values involves the
independence and integrity of the courts themselves.
The judiciary’s power “to say what the law is,”
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803), is the power not to make law but to interpret
and apply it according to the court’s own best
judgment. Changing the applicable law does not
intrude on that judgment. But telling a court what
outcome to reach, what legal conclusions to draw, or
how to apply the existing law to facts compromises
the independence and integrity of the courts. Judicial
legitimacy rests critically on the neutral application
of general principals. Herbert Wechsler famously
See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965)
(“For if governmental power is fractionalized, if a given policy
can be implemented only by a combination of legislative
enactment, judicial application, and executive implementation,
no man or group of men will be able to impose its unchecked
will.”).
12

See, e.g., Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(explaining how the requirement that legislatures may not
control to whom the laws will be applied prevents abuse of
power).
13

See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 966 (Powell, J., concurring in the
judgment) (noting the lack of procedural safeguards when
legislatures directly effect deprivations of rights).
14

12

said “the main constituent of the judicial process is
precisely that it must be genuinely principled,
resting with respect to every step that is involved in
reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite
transcending the immediate result that is
achieved.”15 If Congress may require a court to reach
a particular result, without providing a neutral
principle on which to rest that decision, then little
would remain of Professor Wechsler’s notion.
Moreover, this threat to judicial integrity is
also a threat to the mechanisms of accountability
that ordinarily discipline the democratic process.
Congress does not have the same obligation of
principled decisionmaking that courts do. But it
should not be able to evade democratic responsibility
for the choices it makes by misrepresenting those
choices as judicial decrees. As Henry Hart explained
over a half-century ago,
It is one thing to exclude completely the
federal courts from adjudication; it is
quite another to vest the federal courts
with jurisdiction to adjudicate but
simultaneously restrict the power of
those courts to perform the adjudicatory
function in the manner they deem
appropriate. In the former instance, by
wholly excluding the federal courts,
Congress loses its ability to draw upon
the integrity possessed by the Article III
judiciary in the public’s eyes. In
contrast, where Congress employs the
federal courts to implement its
Herbert L. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles
Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1959).
15

13

in

deception, the harmful consequences to
that judicial integrity are far more
significant.16
As Professor Hart suggested, Congress may seek to
evade responsibility for its laws by contriving that
they be announced as legal judgments. That
undermines not only the integrity of the courts’
decisional processes but also the operation of
democratic accountability on the legislative side.
This Court has affirmed the institutional
independence and integrity of the Article III courts
in ringing terms in cases like Plaut v. Spendthrift
Farms, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995), and Stern v.
Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608-09 (2011). But it
does little good to prevent Congress from reopening
final judicial judgments or from reassigning
decisionmaking responsibility to non-Article III
courts if Congress may simply tell the Article III
judiciary how to decide cases in the first place. That
is why scholars have interpreted Klein as insisting
that “[t]he judiciary will not permit its articulate
authority to be subverted to serve ends antagonistic
to its actual judgment; the judiciary will resist efforts
to make it seem to support and regularize that with
which it in fact disagrees.”17 In other words, if the
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress To Limit the
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66
Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1372 (1953); see also Lawrence G. Sager,
Klein’s First Principle: A Proposed Solution, 86 Geo. L. J. 2525,
2529 (1998) (arguing that Klein is directed toward preventing
the “co-optation of the judiciary’s national authority”).
16

Sager, supra note 16,. at 2529; see also Martin H. Redish &
Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception, Separation of
Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political
Theory of United States v. Klein, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 437, 43817

14

judiciary interprets the preexisting law to require an
outcome, it may not be required to reach the opposite
conclusion unless that preexisting law is duly
changed.
C.

Section
8772
violates
Klein’s
principle by directing a result in
pending
litigation
without
amending the underlying law.

Although amici have spent years constructing
hypotheticals to illustrate Klein’s meaning for our
students, it is difficult to imagine a clearer violation
than the present case. Generally speaking, the
category of assets subject to execution in order to
satisfy Respondents’ default judgments would be
governed by New York law, which has adopted
Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code. As
Petitioners explain, see Petr’s Brief at 3–5, § 8-112(c)
of the U.C.C. provides that a creditor may reach only
those assets held by the securities intermediary
“with whom the debtor’s securities account is
maintained.” Creditors may not go more than one
step, reaching assets held by another intermediary
on behalf of the entity maintaining the debtor’s
account. See U.C.C. § 112 cmt. 3. Because Petitioner
is a foreign central bank, the federal Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act provided another layer of
protection for “property . . . of a foreign central bank
or monetary authority held for its own account.” 28
U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1).
Subsequent statutes have modified the
underlying federal protections, amending the FSIA
39 (2006) (reading Klein to forbid Congress from enlisting the
judiciary in deceiving the electorate as to the actual state of the
law).
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to permit suits against foreign sovereigns for certain
acts of terrorism, see Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §
221, 110 Stat. 1214, 1241, and permitting execution
against assets blocked by the President under certain
economic sanctions statutes, see Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002 (“TRIA”), Pub. L. No. 107-297,
§ 201, 116 Stat. 2322, 2337. While these statutes had
predictable effects on certain sorts of claims, they
articulated general rules of decision. Moreover, they
neither modified the rule that plaintiffs may execute
judgments only against assets that actually belong to
the guilty party nor provided a test for ownership
independent of state law provisions like U.C.C. § 8112.
Section 8772 of the Iran Threat Reduction and
Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, however,
represents a profoundly different approach. That
statute focused solely on particular assets against
which Respondents sought execution in a particular
lawsuit—identified by name and docket number in
the statutory text—and directed that those assets
“shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid of
execution in order to satisfy any judgment to the
extent of any compensatory damages awarded
against Iran.” 22 U.S.C. § 8772(a)(1). Congress stated
that its purpose was “to ensure that Iran is held
accountable for paying the judgments described in
paragraph (1),” as part of “the broader goals of this
Act to sanction Iran.” Id. § 8772(a)(2).
Although the line between directing a result
and amending the underlying law may sometimes be
fuzzy, it is not fuzzy here. Section 8772 does not
articulate a new rule for when assets may be
reached; it provides no new principle to replace
16

U.C.C. 8-112(c). Rather, it simply directs that the
specific assets here “shall be subject to execution or
attachment.” There is no general principle
whatsoever—only a mandatory result.
Moreover, the breathtaking specificity of the
statute makes clear that no new law has been made.
The law does not apply to a general class of assets,
but rather only to “the financial assets that are
identified in and the subject of proceedings in the
United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic
Republic of Iran et al., Case No. 10 Civ. 4518 (BSJ)
(GWG).” 22 U.S.C. § 8772(b); see also § 8772(c)(2)
(providing that “[n]othing in this section shall be
construed . . . to apply to assets other than the assets
described in subsection (b)”). Subsection (c) clarifies,
moreover, that the statute does not “affect the
availability, or lack thereof, of a right to satisfy a
judgment in any other action against a terrorist
party in any proceedings other than proceedings
referred to in subsection (b).” 22 U.S.C. § 8772(c)(1).
The statute is truly a ticket for this day and train
only. If other terrorism plaintiffs seeking to execute
identical default judgments filed an identical
lawsuit, they would not get the benefit of § 8772.18
Nor does the statute govern similarly situated
claimants in any other context. If this statute is
taken to amend the underlying law, then there is
truly no distinction between so doing and directing
the result in a pending case.
If the district court were to dismiss this action without
prejudice on the basis of some technical defect in the complaint,
it is not even clear that § 8772 would apply to Respondents after
they re-filed their lawsuit.
18
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It makes no difference that the statute leaves
two determinations for the district court to make.
Section 8772(a)(2) requires two judicial findings as a
predicate to execution or attachment: “the court shall
determine whether Iran holds equitable title to, or
the beneficial interest in, the assets described in
subsection (b) and that no other person possesses a
constitutionally protected interest in the assets
described in subsection (b) under the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.” 22 U.S.C. § 8772(a)(2). Neither of these
preconditions in this case is in dispute here—nor, of
course, is the statute even applicable to any other
circumstances in which they might be in dispute.
But in any event a Klein violation does not
require that Congress direct every finding in the
case.19 Congress could not save a statute directing a
particular result in a pending case simply by
requiring the court to first find that it had personal
jurisdiction of the dispute. Nor could Congress
require a court to find the defendant liable then
leave it to determine damages, or direct it to certify a
particular class action, or even require the court to
find against the defendant with respect to a
particular defense. The offense against judicial
independence occurs when Congress requires a court
to resolve a particular issue in accord with
Congress’s wishes, rather than the court’s own best
view of the underlying law and facts. Klein does not
ask for some sort of on-balance judgment as to

The statute in Klein itself required at least a preliminary
finding that the claimant’s case rested on a pardon, rather than
on other proof of loyalty.
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whether the court has been left with anything
meaningful to do.
We do not deny that it is often difficult to draw
a clear line between legislative directions to decide a
pending case in a particular way under the existing
law and amendments to the underlying law that
effectively resolve pending cases. And in the close
cases, this Court and the lower courts have generally
deferred to Congress, interpreting the acts in
question as legitimate examples of the latter
phenomenon rather than unconstitutional instances
of the former. That is all to the good. But Klein’s
principle—narrow as it is—has stood as an
affirmance of the courts’ fundamental independence
and a deterrent to legislation that treads close to the
line. It is no coincidence that Congress rarely
legislates in ways that even arguably direct a
decision in pending cases. But if this Court, by
upholding § 8772, tells Congress that it can tell the
courts how to decide cases, then Congress is likely to
tell the courts how to decide cases more often.
II.

Section 8772 invades the province of the
courts by purporting to legislate with
respect to a single case.

Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), that “[i]t is the
peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe
general rules for the government of society; the
application of those rules would seem to be the duty
of other departments.” Id. at 136. This principle—
that legislation may invade the judicial province
when it lacks a general character—is distinct from
the problem in Klein. That case, after all, involved a
general directive to resolve all claims for restoration
19

of property predicated on a presidential pardon in
accord with Congress’s view that pardons were proof
of disloyalty, contrary to the Court’s prior decision in
Padelford. The statute potentially governed a
number of different suits by different claimants.
Here, however, Congress has singled out a single
case for its mandate. Our contention is that even if
one views § 8772 as having modified the underlying
law with respect to execution on assets held by
intermediaries, the fact that the statute does so only
with respect to these assets and these parties, and
only in this case, is sufficient to doom the law.
A.

Congress
ordinarily
may
not
legislate with respect to a single
case.

Petitioners have collected ample historical
evidence that Chief Justice Marshall’s understanding
of the critical distinction between the legislative and
judicial functions was widely shared by the founding
generation and consistently followed throughout our
history. Petr’s Brief at 22–25, 29–35. The clearest
example of this understanding in the constitutional
text is the Bill of Attainder Clause, U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 9, cl. 3, which prohibits “trial by legislature.”
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965).
That Clause, of course, addressed a specific set of
historical abuses under English and early American
practice, and this Court’s cases have confined its
ambit to legislative “punishment.” Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425
(1977). But the Court has also made clear that the
Bill of Attainder Clause does not exhaust the
requirement of legislative generality. As this Court
said in Brown, “the Bill of Attainder Clause not only
was intended as one implementation of the general
20

principle of fractionalized power, but also reflected
the Framers' belief that the Legislative Branch is not
so well suited as politically independent judges and
juries to the task of ruling upon the
blameworthiness, of, and levying appropriate
punishment upon, specific persons.” Brown, 381 U.S.
at 445.20
These concerns about legislative trials are no
less salient when Congress acts to disadvantage
particular persons in particular cases, even when
those disadvantages do not qualify as “punishment”
for attainder purposes. The legislative process is
designed primarily to identify and vindicate the
majority will, not provide due process for the
minority.21 As Justice Powell pointed out in INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), “[t]he Framers were
well acquainted with the danger of subjecting the
determination of the rights of one person to the
“tyranny of shifting majorities.” Id. at 961 (Powell, J.,
concurring in the judgment). He concluded that “trial
by a legislature lacks the safeguards necessary to
prevent the abuse of power.” Id. at 962.

See also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 241-43
(1995) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (observing that
the principle of legislative generality is expressed both in the
Bill of Attainder Clause and “in the Constitution’s ‘general
allocation of power’”) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 962
(1983) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment)).
20

See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 966 (1983) (Powell, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“Unlike the judiciary or an
administrative agency, Congress is not bound by established
substantive rules. Nor is it subject to the procedural safeguards,
such as the right to counsel and a hearing before an impartial
tribunal, that are present when a court or an agency
adjudicates individual rights.”).
21
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This requirement of legislative generality is
our primary safeguard against any number of
oppressive legislative actions, and it is reflected in a
number of other constitutional provisions. As Justice
Scalia has explained
What assures us that those limits [of
humane treatment] will not be exceeded
is the same constitutional guarantee
that is the source of most of our
protection-what
protects
us,
for
example, from being assessed a tax of
100% of our income above the
subsistence level, from being forbidden
to drive cars, or from being required to
send our children to school for 10 hours
a day, none of which horribles are
categorically
prohibited
by
the
Constitution. Our salvation is the Equal
Protection Clause, which requires the
democratic majority to accept for
themselves and their loved ones what
they impose on you and me.22
These safeguards are defeated if Congress may
single out highly-specific applications for its laws.
The form of § 8772, which mandates relief in a
single case for specific plaintiffs for claims brought
under generally applicable principles of tort, raises a
further problem. If Congress may specify special
relief in particular cases, or set aside generally
applicable defenses or limitations on remedies for
particular litigation, then it may undermine the
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 300 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also
Araiza, supra note 2, at 1089-1106 (discussing various
constitutional requirements of generality).
22

22

generality even of laws phrased in general terms. No
one would dispute that the laws prescribing liability
for terrorist atrocities or the general prohibition on
reaching
assets
through
multiple
financial
intermediaries are general laws. But if Congress is
permitted to amend those laws to exempt only
particular persons in particular cases, then it can
destroy the initial evenhandedness of those
enactments. One may doubt, for example, whether
Congress will pierce the protections of foreign central
banks not directly holding assets in the United
States as they pertain to countries with whom the
United States is on good terms. No law is general if
Congress may pick and choose when litigation under
it will succeed and when it will fail.
This Court’s decision in Nixon did reject a
claim that any legislation directed at a single person
is necessarily unconstitutional, denying that the
Clause “limit[s] Congress to the choice of legislating
for the universe, or legislating only benefits, or not
legislating at all.” 433 U.S. at 471. As Petitioner
rightly points out, the law at issue in Nixon applied
to a wide range of potential cases concerning
President Nixon’s papers, not just a single litigation.
Moreover, Nixon was an extraordinary case in which
the subject of the legislation “constituted a legitimate
class of one.” Id. at 472. Decisions by the courts of
appeals have likewise recognized that sometimes
Congress may legislate with respect to a legitimately
unique problem (although these cases typically
govern more than one potential case). In National
Coalition to Save Our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d 1092
(D.C. Cir. 2001), for example, the D.C. Circuit found
that legislation specific to the World War II
memorial on the National Mall was legitimately
23

confined to “a unique public amenity.” Id. at 1097.
What is required is some account of why the
legislation is so confined. Courts may accord
substantial deference to such accounts while still
requiring that they be either articulated or inferable
from the circumstances.
There are, of course, other sorts of instances in
which Congress acts in a way directed at particular
individuals or entities or even at particular
litigation. Since the beginning of the Republic, for
example, Congress has enacted “private bills” that
may pay a judgment against the United States,
waive the United States’ sovereign immunity, or
release the Government’s own claims. But these
circumstances are quite different from legislation
aimed at resolving a single case. First, all of them
involve the exercise of either Congress’s Article IV
power to “dispose” of government property or its
general implicit authority to regulate the United
States’ own conduct in litigation—neither of which is
a general legislative power and may be subject to less
stringent requirements of generality.23 Second, as
Petitioners point out, these sorts of private bills
typically involve public rights over which Congress
typically has broad discretion, see Petr’s Brief at 41;
we are unaware of any private bills altering the
outcome of litigation between private parties. Third,
many private bills operate to facilitate litigation—not
to direct its outcome. Bills to pay judgments operate
to permit recovery after litigation has ended; waivers
of government claims will typically occur prior to its
It is worth noting that both Nixon and National Coalition to
Save Our Mall likewise involved the disposition of government
property.
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commencement; and neither undermines the rights
of private litigants. Finally, private bills to pay
judgments (and arguably bills to waive sovereign
immunity) are enacted in service of another
constitutional mandate, which is that public
expenditures must be pursuant to “Appropriations
made by Law,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. That
principle surely permits, and sometimes requires, a
greater degree of specificity than regulatory
legislation specifying the rights and duties of private
actors.
In Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503
U.S. 429 (1992), this Court declined to consider a
legislative generality challenge to a federal statute
on the ground that it had not been properly
presented to the court of appeals and not advanced
by a party in the Supreme Court. See id. at 441.
Even if the Court had reached the question, the
statute in Robertson applied by its terms to a
significant swath of important federal lands over a
significant period of time, and it governed all
controversies pertaining to timber sales on those
lands and in that time period. Moreover, the limited
scope of the timber compromise was determined, in
significant part, by the limited habitat of the
northern spotted owl. The present litigation presents
a much clearer case.
B.

Section 8772 violates the principle
of legislative generality.

This case squarely presents the question that
the Court reserved in Robertson. As § 8772(b) makes
clear, the Act applies only to “the financial assets
that are identified in and the subject of proceedings
in the United States District Court for the Southern
25

District of New York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic
Republic of Iran et al., Case No. 10 Civ. 4518 (BSJ)
(GWG).” Section 8772(c) then clarifies that the Act
does not “affect the availability, or lack thereof, of a
right to satisfy a judgment in any other action
against a terrorist party in any proceedings other
than proceedings referred to in subsection (b).” The
act is not simply a general rule that is intended to
influence a pending case; rather, it only applies to a
single pending case. Even if other cases are
indistinguishable in terms of their facts or the legal
claims at issue, § 8772 cannot apply.
This case illustrates the wisdom of the
Framers’ insistence on legislative generality.
Petitioner—the national bank of a nation that has
branded America “the Great Satan” and carried out
any number of reprehensible acts against its
citizens—is hardly popular in Congress; it is
eminently understandable why Congress might wish
to impose unique disadvantages upon it. And
Respondents here, the victims of tragic injuries, are
highly sympathetic; compensating them is a laudable
public purpose. But in a nation that treasures its
commitment to the rule of law, the dispute here must
be resolved according to neutral principles. If
Congress were simply to take resources from the
Bank in order to compensate Respondents, for
example, it would be obliged to pay compensation.
See U.S. Const. amdt. V.24 Having elected instead to
let Respondents seek compensation through private
See also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1071-72 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that
Takings law has “frequently looked to the generality of a
regulation of property”) (emphasis in original); accord Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4 (1987).
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litigation, Congress may not effectively render its
own verdict by specifying a rule to govern only this
single case.
It is true, of course, that legislatures
constantly draw distinctions and classifications
among persons subject to the law. And when they do
so, they need not always adopt a general principle
and follow it to its logical conclusion; rather, “the
reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself
to the phase of the problem which seems most acute
to the legislative mind.” Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). Even then,
of course, the classification must be rational and nonarbitrary. Id. at 488. But where the legislative
classification confines the law’s effect to a single case,
pending in the federal courts, additional concerns of
separation of powers come into play. In that area,
this Court has insisted upon “prophylactic” rules,
“establishing high walls and clear distinctions
because low walls and vague distinctions will not be
judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch
conflict.” Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S.
211, 239 (1995).25
A law confined to a single pending case is a
legislative trial, and therefore unconstitutional.

Plaut doubted “[t]he premise that there is something wrong
with particularized legislative action.” 514 U.S. at 239 n.9. But
the law in Plaut affected many different cases, not just one, see
id. at 227, and therefore did not raise the spectre of Congress
actually appropriating the judicial function to itself.
25
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit should be reversed.
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